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INTRODUCTION

Freedom of religion is one of the most important freedoms guaranteed by our Constitution.' In fact, the United States Supreme
Court has concluded that the religious liberty secured by the Constitution is of a higher dignity than some of our other constitutional
guarantees. 2 A search for greater religious freedom was a significant
motivation for the colonization of America, 3 and although in practice the early colonists rated little better than the Mother Country in
their religious toleration, our dedication to religious liberty has
grown through the years so that no one would now seriously question the framers' wisdom in protecting 4that religious liberty by the
religion clauses of the first amendment.
Religious liberty in America is widely perceived to be the product
of the principle of "separation of church and state," 5 and although
that phrase does not appear in the Constitution, it is generally
thought that the religion clauses - "Congress shall make no law
1. See Hudspeth, Separationof Church and State in America, 33 TExAs L. REV. 1035,
1047 n.49 (1955).

2. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) (freedom of religion in favored position); R. MILLER & R. FLOWERS, TOWARD BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY: CHURCH,
STATE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 63-64 (1982).
3. See Hudspeth, Separation of Church and State in America, 33 TEXAS L. REV. 1035,

1038 (1955) (freedom from persecution and freedom to worship were motivating factors for
many early colonists not of same beliefs).
4. See Stanmeyer, Free Exercise and the Wall.- The Obsolescence of a Metaphor, 37
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 223, 224 (1968) (religion clauses meant to prevent government from

crushing personal conscience and religious dissent).
5. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952). In delivering the Court's opinion,
Justice Douglas stated: "There cannot be the slightest doubt that the First Amendment
reflects the philosophy that Church and State should be separated." Id at 312; see also
Stanmeyer, FreeExercise andthe Wall- The Obsolescence of a Metaphor, 37 GEO. WASH. L.

REV. 223, 223 (1968) (most citizens perceive church-state relation to be one of separation);
Toscano, A Dubious Neutrality. The Establishment of Secularism in the Public Schools, 1979

B.Y.U. L. REV. 177, 190-91 (Constitution does not mention separation yet Supreme Court
works from that theory).
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respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof" 6 - mandate such a separation. Separation, however,
like many other terms used in church-state relations, means different
things to different groups;7 even if all could agree on a general principle of separation, they would still differ greatly on its proper application.8 To some it means no governmental recognition or
interaction with religion; to others it simply means neutrality and
non-interference. 9 The subject is complex and provokes deep emotion, and there is no general agreement on ultimate principles or
solutions. '0
The religion clauses were designed to avoid rather than cause
trouble, but as Joseph Tussman observes, they have troubled us a
great deal and the storm has not yet passed: "The First Amendment
in its attractive brevity leaves much unstated and seems to take
much for granted. . . Is it the practical expression of a 'religious
people'? Or is it a tolerant statement of a commitment to a secular
experiment."" There is no easy answer to the question, and the
Supreme Court, instead of providing sound principles and solutions,
has compounded the problem.' 2 Its decisions in this area, particu6. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7. See C. LOWELL, THE GREAT CHURCH STATE FRAUD 7-10 (1973); Derr, The First

Amendment as a Guide to Church State Relations.- Theological Illusions, CulturalFantasies,
and Legal Practicalities,in CHURCH, STATE

AND POLITICS

75, 83 (J. Hensel ed. 1982).

8. See Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (easier to
agree on goals of religion clauses than on "the Standards that should govern their application"). See generally H. BROWN, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLIC 125, 126 (1977)

(discusses differing viewpoints as to its meaning); Hudspeth, Separationof Church and State
in America, 33 TEXAS L. REV. 1035, 1056 (1955) (many advocate separation, yet all differ in
its application).
9. See H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT 261-62 (1972) (neutrality and separa-

tion were intent of framers, yet concepts may be interpreted differently; courts face problem
of line drawing); Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause Value, 77
YALE L.J. 692, 709 (1968) (some believe religion clauses only prohibit an official religion,
others believe they only mean no governmental aid to religion); Comment, Religious Activity
in Public Schools: A Proposed Standard,24 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 379, 392-93 (1980) (general
discussion of "cooperation," "separation," and "neutrality" theories of interpretation).
10. See M. KONVITZ, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND CONSCIENCE, A CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY 49-50 (1968) (one man's beliefs may be totally different from another's, yet each is

constitutionally protected; there is no test for determining validity of those beliefs); cf.
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445-46 (1963) (Constitution protects without regard to the
"truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered").
11. See THE SUPREME COURT ON CHURCH AND STATE Xiii (J. Tussman ed. 1962).
12. See Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970) (first amendment religion
clauses, if construed to their logical extreme, necessarily conflict); Choper, The Religion
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larly in establishment clause cases, have been inconsistent, and more
often than not have failed to command the full accord of the
Court.' 3 They have been received by the public and legal experts
with mixed feelings and have stirred up some of the liveliest and
most partisan debates in our nation's history.' 4 The Court's justices
frankly admit their failure to develop any theory which produces a
principled analysis of the church-state issues coming before them.' 5
Justice Jackson said: "It is a matter on which we can find no law
but our own prepossessions."' 6 Justice White has commented that
the problems "are not easy; they stir deep feelings; and we are divided among ourselves, perhaps reflecting the different views on this
' 7
subject of the people of this country."'
The Supreme Court should recognize that it has misinterpreted
the establishment clause and adopt a new standard of interpretation
consistent with the text of the first amendment, the history leading
to its adoption, the intent of the framers, and one which will avoid
the egregious results the existing theories of interpretation have
produced.
Clauses of The First Amendment.- Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 675
(1980). From the view taken by this author, one is led to the conclusion that because the
religion clauses are viewed "as embodying two independent mandates," the Supreme Court
has been forced to apply separate tests to each provision. See id at 673-74. The application
of these separate tests has led to confusion and unanswered questions as to the intent of the
framers of the Constitution. See id at 673-74.
13. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646
(1980) (5-4 decision in establishment clause case, two dissents filed); Wolman v. Walter, 433
U.S. 229 (1977) (establishment clause provision construed, five justices concurred in part
and dissented in part); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (two
concurring opinions filed, one dissent filed in case construing religion clauses).
14. See Hudspeth, Separation of Church and State in America, 33 TEXAs L. REV. 1035,
1035 (1955) (church-state relations of high public interest).
15. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 663
(1980) (Blackman, J., dissenting) (any line which the Court has drawn must, as a result of
varying decisions, be considered a wavering line at best); see id at 671 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (cases have been decided on an ad hoc basis); Wolman v, Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 266
(1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (courts' attempts have been ineffective and have failed to
provide guiding principles); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 325 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (distinctions made by Court in construing cases of this type have been trivial and
minor).
16. See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 238 (1948) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
17. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662
(1980).
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II.

THE CONCEPT OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY

The early colonists in America had either experienced or observed the oppression which resulted from the establishment of state
churches in Europe.' 8 The resulting fear of alliances between government and the church carried over to future generations and still
prevailed when the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were
formed.' 9 Although many Americans at that time were perfectly
willing to allow established churches at the state level, 20 they were
wary of the federal government and took positive steps to prevent it
from interfering with the existing state churches or the right of the
citizens to fully express and exercise their religious beliefs.2 1
The colonists' conception of the strictures placed on government
in religious affairs was not as expansive as that of many people today, 22 but although limited, it was essentially a concept of religious
liberty, and they employed the language of the religion clauses to
protect that liberty from the federal government.2 3 So, although the
clauses are separate, they complement one another and together express the single concept of religious liberty.24 The framers could see
in the violation of either the establishment clause or the free exercise
18. See A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 20-23
(1964).
19. See id. at 24 (largest influence of framers was desire to separate church and state);
cf. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947) (colonists came to America to escape
tyranny of laws and compelled support of state churches).
20. See L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 91-92 (1967) (at time of revolution, majority of states had some form of establishment).
21. See Choper, The Religion Clauses of the FirstAmendment: Reconciling the Conflict,
41 U. Prrr. L. REV. 673, 676 (1980) (purpose of establishment clause is to shield state
churches from federal government); see also Toscano, A Dubious Neutrality.- The Establishmen of Secularism in the Public Schools, 1979 B.Y.U. L. REV. 177, 190 (framers' intent was
not separation, but to restrict federal government from interfering with state churches).
22. See L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 89-102, 119 (1967) (general discussion of nature of religious activity and ideals in colonies prior to revolution); Borden,
Federalists,Antifederalists, and Religious Freedom, 21 J. CHURCH & ST. 469, 469-82 (1979).
23. See H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT 247 (1972) (establishment clause
more the result of desire for freedom generally than non-establishment specifically); Howard, Up Against the Wall: The Uneasy Separationof Church and State, in CHURCH, STATE
AND POLITICS 5, 24 (J. Hensel ed. 1981).
24. See, e.g., Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.: Reconciling the
Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 677 (1980) (central purpose of religion clauses was protection of religious liberty); Howard, Up Against the Wall: The Uneasy Separation of Church
and State, in CHURCH, STATE AND POLITICS 5, 24 (J. Hensel ed. 1981) (purpose is to promote and protect religious liberties); Pfeffer, Freedom and/orSeparation: The Constitutional
Dilemma ofthe FirstAmendment, 64 MINN. L. REV. 561, 567 (1980) (purpose of separation is
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clause an element of coercion and a resulting denial of liberty: an
established church involves coercive support by the taxpayers; interference in the free exercise of religion involves coercion in the form
of negative restraints.
III.

THE PRESENT STATE OF CONFUSION

It has not been easy to delineate the scope of religious liberty.
The meaning of the religion clauses is not self-evident. 25 Chief Justice Burger has said that they are "at best opaque. 26 Line drawing
has been difficult, and one commentator has aptly described establishment clause interpretation as a "hornet's nest."27 The Supreme
Court, after years of struggling to find a reasonable interpretation of
the clauses, has left us a legacy of confusion, contradiction, and inconsistency. As said by Professor A.E. Dick Howard of the University of Virginia Law School: "The uninitiated observer who seeks to
make sense of the Supreme Court's rulings in establishment clause
cases is in for a shock."2 A few examples vividly illustrate the truth
of that statement:
the government may not supplement parochial school teachers'
salaries,29 but it may employ and pay with public tax money chaplains in legislative bodies, the armed services, and in public prisons
and it may pay for veterans' sectarian training for the
and hospitals,
30
ministry;
the states may not allow noncompulsory prayer, Bible reading,
or meditation in the public schools, 3 but it is permissible to have
to promote religious freedom) (quoting Katz, The CaseforReligious Liberty, in RELIGION IN
AMERICA 97 (J. Cogley ed. 1958)).
25. See R. MILLER & R. FLOWERS, TOWARD BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY: CHURCH,
STATE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 297 (1982).
26. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
27. See H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT 207 (1972).
28. See Howard, Up Against the Walk The Uneasy Separationof Church and State, in
CHURCH, STATE AND POLITICS 5, 21 (J. Hensel ed. 1981).
29. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 607 (1971).
30. See Marsh v. Chambers, - U.S. _, __, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3336, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1019,
1029 (1983) (compensation of chaplain with state money is not in violation of establishment
clause); Illinois ex re. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 253-54 (1948) (Reed, J.,

dissenting) (Congress has chaplain, army has chaplains, veterans may receive training for
ministry at government expense).
31. See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963)
(reading from Bible in school violates establishment clause); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,

436 (1962) (states may not allow students to recite a composed prayer in school).
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opening prayers in Congress and the Supreme Court, as well as "In
God We Trust" on our currency, and "Under
God" in the Pledge of
32
Anthem;
National
the
and
Allegiance
- high schools may not allow religious groups to use school prop34
erty even after school hours,3 3 but colleges may not refuse to do so;
- states may furnish bus transportation to parochial school children, 35 but may 36not pay the expenses of their field trips for instructional purposes;
the state may loan textbooks to
parochial schools, 37 but not
38
materials;
other teaching and testing
- a state may exempt church property and schools from taxation, 39 but may not40 reimburse church schools for expenses of tests
and examinations;
a state may not give financial aid to repair a church supported
secondary school,4 I but may build academic buildings for sectarian
colleges 42 and lease state land
to a church school for the purposes of
43
working a tax exemption;
- a state may compel a business to close on Sunday and may pay
32. See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 299-304 (1963).
33. See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) (use of
state's public buildings for religious purposes is not separation of church and state); Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038, 1046 (5th Cir.
1982) (authorization of meetings, whether prior or .subsequent to school day, have primary
effect of promoting religion), cert. denied, - U.S. 103 S. Ct. 800, 74 L. Ed. 2d 1003
(1983). But cf. Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 978 (2d Cir. 1980) (neutral policy
allowing all student groups to meet in public school buildings is not promotion of religion,
but promotion of extracurricular activities), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981).
34. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-69 (1981) (where state university has
opened its facilities to public, it may not then discriminate against religious groups seeking
its use).
35. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947).
36. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 254 (1977).
37. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 362 (1975); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S.
236, 245-48 (1968); Cochran v. Board of Educ., 281 U.S. 370, 375 (1930).
38. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372-73 (1975).
39. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 812
(1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (tax benefit consistent with neutrality); Walz v. Tax
Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970).
40. See Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 480
(1973).
41. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 77475 (1973).
42. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678-80 (1971).
43. See Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 749 (1973).
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for and display a nativity scene on public property,' but may not
allow schools to display the Ten Commandments in their
hallways;45
- public schools may not allow released time for religious services on school property,46 but may for services held off the
47
premises;
- states may not give tax relief only for tuition paid to parochial
schools, 48 but may allow tax deductions for such tuition if the pro49
gram also allows a similar deduction for public school expenses;
and the state may provide therapeutic and diagnostic health
services to a church school in a mobile unit parked next to the
5
school, 50 but not in the school itself.
IV.

SCHOLARLY RECOGNITION OF THE PROBLEM

Constitutional law scholars and other observers are virtually
unanimous in labeling the Supreme Court's decisions in establishment cases as inconsistent and unprincipled judgments based on the
Court's perceived notions of public policy and the exigencies of the
44. See Lynch v. Donnelly,
U.S. ___ 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1362-63, 79 L. Ed. 2d 604,
614-15 (1984); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
45. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980).
46. See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210 (1948) (amounts
to use of tax supported schools to further religious groups).
47. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (Constitution does not require
government to have callous indifference towards religion).
48. See Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 832 (1973) (effect is promotion of religion by
giving incentive for parents to send children to sectarian school); Committee for Pub. Educ.
& Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783-86 (1973) (whether grants go to parents or
directly to sectarian school is of no consequence as it provides monetary support for nonsecular groups).
49. See Mueller v. Allen, - U.S. _ _ 103 S.Ct. 3062, 3066-67, 77 L. Ed. 2d 721, 728
(1983) (where intent is to reduce educational costs regardless of the type of school involved,
the purpose is secular).
50. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 248 (1977) (services do not have the effect of
advancing religious purposes).
51. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 368-69 (1975). The act involved in this case
provided that the state supply auxiliary services to students through state employees. Appellants argued that this was an establishment of religion because the services were provided on
the grounds of the nonpublic school. The Supreme Court rejected the district court's determination that, because the services were provided directly to the students and not to the
schools, any benefit to the school was incidental. The basis for the Supreme Court's rejection of this position was that the district court erred in relying "on the good faith and professionalism of the secular teachers and counselors functioning in church related schools to
ensure that a strictly nonideological posture is maintained." See id at 368-69.
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moment. 52 Many of the Court's decisions on this subject are diametrically opposite and appear to be "tailor made" for the particular case. In an article on establishment clause cases, Jeremy Plust
and Gary Brewsaugh observed:
Thus, the cases have not been determined by rules of law; the rules
have been created according to the dictates of each case ....
[T]his
mode of analysis has led the Court to partake of logically indefensible
rhetoric; [and] has led to unnecessary inconsistency as the Court has
struggled to free itself from the entanglement of precedent. ... .

Experts in this area of constitutional law, such as Kurland, Kauper,
Choper, and Giannella, among others, have also decried the Court's
lack of principled analysis and have urged new tests or theories of
adjudication designed to solve the dilemma. 54 But the strongest criticism of the Court's decisions has come from the justices themselves.
52. See H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT 271, 278 (1972) (courts have failed to
provide clear answers); D. OAKS, THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 4 (1963) (determination of meaning of establishment clause often begins with conclusion as to desirability
of one solution, followed by rejection or acceptance of theories based on their conformity
with the conclusion); see also Clark, Comments on Some Policies Underlying the Constitutional Law ofReligious Freedom, 64 MINN. L. REV. 453, 456 (1980) (Court's rationale for
explaining distinctions made in cases is unsatisfactory); Hudspeth, Separationof Church and
State in America, 33 TEXAS L. REV. 1035, 1035 (1955) (decisions inconsistent and little agreement among justices); Scheffer, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Free Exercise Clause.- Are
Standards ofAdjudication Possible, 23 J. CHURCH & ST. 533, 534 (1981) (meaning given to
religion clauses essentially Supreme Court substituting its own legal values for the justices'
individual spiritual ideals); Comment, The 1971 U.S. Supreme Court and the Religion
Clauses.- The Wall Becomes an Indistinct Barrier, 24 BAYLOR L. REV. 565, 572, 576 (1972)
(federal government feels need to aid nonpublic schools financially; recent decisions discard
"wall" for indistinct, wavering line.)
53. See Comment, Toward the Logical and Consistent Adjudication of Establishment
Clause Cases, 5 W. STATE U.L. REV. 117, 127 (1977).
54. See Choper, The Religion Clauses ofthe FirstAmendment. Reconciling the Conflict,
41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 675 (1980). This author's proposal for proper application of the
establishment clause is that an act is unconstitutional if (1) its sole purpose is religious,
irrespective of any incidental secular benefits which might result, and (2) it is likely to inhibit
religious liberty by "coercing, compromising, or influencing religious beliefs." See id at 675;
see also Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1382-88 (1967); Kauper, Everson v. Board ofEducation." A Product of
the JudicialWill, 15 ARIz. L. REV. 307, 307-26 (1973); Kurland, OfChurchand State andthe
Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 96 (1961). The author states that:
The freedom and separation clauses should be read as stating a single precept: that
government cannot utilize religion as a standard for action or inaction because these
clauses, read together as they should be, prohibit classification in terms of religion
either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden.
Id at 96.
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They have recognized that the Court's interpretation of the clauses
has caused continuing confusion. 5 Justice Stevens has complained
that "'corrosive precedents' have left us without firm principles on
which to decide these cases." 56 Chief Justice Burger has referred to
"[t]he considerable internal inconsistency in the opinions" 5 and has
apologized for the confusion by saying the Court's principle of interpretation in these cases is founded more on experience and history than on logic.58 Justice Jackson's comment in Saia v. New
York 59 confirms that lack of logic: "I cannot see how we can read
the Constitution one day to forbid and the next day to compel the
use of public tax-supported property to help a religious sect spread
its faith."6° Justice Powell made the greatest understatement yet
seen in the opinions when he noted that, in seeking to arrive at some
principles of adjudication, the Court's endeavor has resulted in a
loss of some "analytical tidiness."' 6 But the confusion, inconsistency, and incorrect decisions in establishment clause cases have not
resulted from the difficulty of the problem; they have resulted from
the Court's failure to recognize the proper theory of church-state
relations mandated by the Constitution, and the incorrect interpretation of the establishment clause which that failure has produced.
V.

THEORIES OF INTERPRETATION

There is probably no field of law where there is as much semantics and confusion of terms as in the church-state field. Some of the
terms used to describe a principle of interpretation, such as "separation," "neutrality," and "accommodation," are contradicted by the
very decisions which invoke them. We can, however, broadly divide the philosophies of establishment clause interpretation into
three theories: the Wall of Separation or Absolute Separation theory; the Strict Neutrality theory; and the Accommodation theory. 62
55. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977) (each case presents analytical
difficulties).

56. See id at 266.
57. See Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
58. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 802

(1973) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
59. 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
60. See id at 569-70 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
61. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 262 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
62. See H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT 253-71 (1972). See generally R.
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Wall of Separation

The Wall of Separation theory gets its name from the famous
metaphor used by Thomas Jefferson in his letter to the Danbury
Baptist Association,63 when he referred to the Constitution as
"building a wall of separation between church and state."' 64 The
theory is also variously called Absolute Separation, 65 Strict Separation,66 and sometimes the No Aid theory.67 It was articulated by the
Supreme Court in Everson v. Boardof Education,6 where the Court
held that New Jersey's reimbursement to parochial school children's
parents for the cost of bus transportation to their schools did not
violate the establishment clause. 69 In a strong statement of principles which seems utterly out of harmony with the decision, Justice
Black set out the Wall of Separation theory:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means
at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will
MILLER & R. FLOWERS, TOWARD BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY: CHURCH, STATE, AND THE

SUPREME COURT 297-302 (1982) (discussing various theories of interpretation); Howard, Up
Against The Wall- The Uneasy Separation of Church and State, in CHURCH, STATE AND

POLITICS 5, 21-27 (J. Hensel ed. 1981) (discusses Court's efforts to find proper test or tests for
analysis).
63. See THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113 (1861).
64. See idat 113.
65. See H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT 253 (1972) (theory is one of strict
separation); L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE & FREEDOM 177-78 (1967) (test used in Everson
and McCollum cases is one of absolute separation); R. MILLER & R. FLOWERS, TOWARD
BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY: CHURCH, STATE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 297 (absolute separation theory means no aid from government); THE SUPREME COURT ON CHURCH AND

STATE xiii (J.Tussman ed. 1962).
66. See H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT 253 (1972) (Strict Separation Theory
requires that government not support religious groups); R.E. MORGAN, THE POLITICS OF
RELIGIOUS CONFLICT 20-26 (1968).
67. See H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT 253 (1972) (test is that government
may give no aid to religious groups); Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion." The Establishment
Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692, 708-09 (1968) (some believe test to be used is one of no aid);
Comment, Establishment ClauseNeutrality and the ReasonableAccommodation Requirement,
4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 901, 911 (1977) (theory in establishment clause cases has sometimes been "no aid to religion").
68. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
69. See id.at 3, 18. But cf.Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203,
231 (1948) (allowing religious teachers to come into public school to instruct is constitutionally objectionable).
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or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person
can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or nonattendance. No tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form
they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs
of any religious organizations or group and vice versa. In the words
of Jefferson, the clause . . . was intended to erect "a wall of separation between Church and State."7
Justice Rutledge's dissent expressed the separation idea this way:
[T]he object was broader than separating church and state in this narrow sense. It was to create a complete and permanent separation of
the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion. . . .The prohibition broadly forbids state support, financial or
other, of religion in any guise, form7 1or degree. It outlaws all use of
public funds for religious purposes.
The theory is also supported by several commentators, although
every approach differs in some respects.72
B.

Strict Neutrality

After Everson, the Court did little but pay lip service to the Wall
of Separation theory, although it seemed to turn in that direction
again somewhat in thie school prayer and Bible reading cases.7 3 For
the most part, though, it moved closer to the second theory: Strict
Neutrality. This theory, best articulated by Professor Phillip Kurland, generally holds that government must be religion blind and
cannot use religion as a standard for action or inaction; stated another way, the Constitution prohibits any classification in terms of
religion, either creating a benefit or imposing a burden. 4
Professor Choper urges a similar kind of strict neutrality, but his
70. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I, 15-16 (1947).
71. Id at 31-33 (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting).
72. See R. MILLER & R. FLOWERS, TOWARD BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY: CHURCH,
STATE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 297 (1982); L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM
253 (1967); Howard, Up Against the Wall The Uneasy Separation of Church and State, in
CHURCH, STATE AND POLITICS 5, 25-27 (J.
Hensel ed. 1981).
73. See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 203 (1963) (Bible reading case); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 421 (1962) (school prayer case).
74. See Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 96
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approach would only invalidate state or federal action which is
likely to compromise one's religious beliefs or influence a religious
or conscientious choice.7" Schwarz urges a similar philosophy
which he calls the "no imposition of religion" test.76 Most of the
Supreme Court's decisions in establishment cases come nearer to fitting into this theory in its purest form than the others,77 because the
three-prong test now used by the Court proscribes state action unless it has a purely secular purpose and a primary effect which
neither advances nor inhibits religion,7" and these are the hallmarks
of the Strict Neutrality or Religion Blind theory.7 9
C. Accommodation
The third main theory of interpretation is Accommodation."
Purists of this persuasion "argue that since there is no possibility of
a national church today, there should be a de-emphasis of the establishment clause and an adherence to free exercise principles."'"
Thus, the most commonly accepted Accommodation theory would
permit government cooperation with and assistance to religion in
general and churches and church schools in particular, even direct
financial aid, so long as the action is nonpreferential among religions.8 2 As Tussman states, accommodationists find no constitu(1961). See generally H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT 257 (1972) (discusses the
argument propounded by Professor Kurland).
75. See Comment, Religious Activity in Public Schools: A Proposed Standard,24 ST.
Louis L.J. 379, 393 (1980) (discussing Choper's viewpoint).
76. See Schwarz, No Imposition ofReligion: The Establishment Clause Value, 77 YALE
L.J. 692, 693 (1968). The author argues that the dilemma of the religion clauses has resulted
from a too broad reading of the establishment clause. Schwarz's theory is that the establishment clause should be interpreted only as prohibiting that aid which has the significant
effect or purpose of imposing a religious belief. See id at 693.

77. See id at 696.
78. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971); see also Comment, Establishment Clause Neutrality and the Reasonable Accommodation Requirement, 4 HASTINGS

CONST. L.Q. 901, 911-15 (1977) (discusses the primary purpose of effect test and its application by the Supreme Court).
79. Cf.Kurland, Of Church, State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. I, 96

(1961) (based on Court's opinions, the test used is the primary effect test).
80. See Comment, Religious Activity in Public Schools. A ProposedStandard, 24 ST.

Louis U.L.J. 379, 392 (1980) (accommodation theory is cooperation between government
and religious groups).
81. See Comment, Religious Activity in Public Schools.: A Proposed Standard,24 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 379, 392 (1980).
82. See Choper, The Religion Clauses ofthe FirstAmendment: Reconciling the Conflict,

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

13

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 16 [2022], No. 1, Art. 1

ST MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 16:1

tional barrier to various forms of government aid to or cooperation
with the religious life of the community, and believe it is altogether
fitting for government "to treat sympathetically the demands of religious life, to aid in furthering the spiritual development of the people-as it furthers material and intellectual development-provided
that it does so with an even hand, without intrusion or control, and
without coercion of non-believers. ' 3
VI.

THE SUPREME COURT'S THREE-PRONG TEST

Some of the elements of all three theories may be found in
Supreme Court decisions, but no clear standards or principles have
emerged.84 The Court has failed to adopt a broad philosophical
theory of church-state relations within the framework of which
guidelines for consistent, constitutionally sound, and workable adjudications can be formulated. Instead, there has evolved from its decisions a narrow, mechanical, three-prong or three-tier test to
determine if state action constitutes an establishment of religion: To
survive constitutional challenge the government action must
(1) have a purely secular purpose, (2) have a primary effect which
neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) not result in an excessive entanglement between government and religion. The first two
prongs of the test were articulated in School District of Abington
41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 695 (1980) (if accommodations for religion impose only nonreligious costs, they are not unconstitutional); see also Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 516 (1968); Howard, Up Against
the Walk The Uneasy Separation of Church and State, in CHURCH, STATE AND POLITICS 5,
25-27 (J. Hensel ed. 1981) (discusses Accommodation and Neutrality theories and difference
within each); Schwarz, No Imposition ofReligion." The Establishment Clause Value, 77 YALE

L.J. 692, 710 (1968) (even most extreme separationists concede some types of nonpreferential
aid). See generally Comment, The 1971 U.S. Supreme Court and the Religion Clauses.- The
Wall Becomes an Indistinct Barrier, 24 BAYLOR L. REV. 565, 573 (1972) (author discusses

view of Professor Pritchett that establishment clause does not prohibit nonpreferential
treatment).
83. See THE SUPREME COURT ON CHURCH AND STATE XV (J. Tussman ed. 1962).
84. Cf Comment, Jefferson and the Church-State Wal" A Historical Examination ofthe
Man andthe Metaphor, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 645, 660-61 (although Court has used preferen-

tial treatment and total separation tests, they have, in recent cases, retreated somewhat from
strict application of these tests).
85. See R. MILLER & R. FLOWERS, TOWARD BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY:

CHURCH,

STATE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 300-01 (1982) (examines development of three-prong test

from School Dist. ofAbington Township and Walz cases). See generally Note, Florey v. Sioux
Falls School Dist., 49 UMKC L. REV. 219, 220 (1981) (review of major cases).
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Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp.86 The third prong first appeared in Walz v. Tax Commissioner," and "[iun all establishment
clause cases after Walz, the [three-prong test has] been used."88
There have been hints of another prong-that of political divisiveness-but it has not yet been formally adopted as a part of the test.8 9
The test has not made the Court's task any easier, 90 and in fact has,
in the words of Professor Choper, "generated ad hoc judgments
which are incapable of being reconciled on any principled basis."91
VII.

INADEQUACIES OF THE TEST

The three-prong test has generated confusion because it is constitutionally unsound and functionally defective. Its first two prongs,
which require that all state action have a purely secular purpose and
a primary effect that does not advance religion, fly in the face of
principles developed by scholarly constitutional analysis,92 and, if
strictly followed, would invalidate many practices both historically
86. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
87. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
88. See R. MILLER & R. FLOWERS, TOWARD BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY: CHURCH,
STATE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 301 (1982).

89. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975) (establishment clause designed to
protect against political division along religious lines); R. MILLER & R. FLOWERS, TOWARD

617 (1982). The
basis for the origin of this idea is that the framers believed that conflicts based upon religious
beliefs have the potential of placing substantial strains on the political system itself. See id;
see also Howard, Up Against the Wall: The Uneasy Separation of Church and State, in
BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY: CHURCH, STATE, AND THE SUPREME COURT

CHURCH, STATE AND POLITICS 5, 22 (J. Hensel ed. 1981) (not clear whether political divi-

siveness is a test or simply a reinforcement of other tests).
90. See Howard, Up Against the Wall: The Uneasy Separationof Church and State, in
CHURCH, STATE AND POLITICS 5, 24 (J. Hensel ed. 1981) (so long as test is used in supple-

mentary manner it may be controlled; if used as independent test, there should be cause for
concern).
9 1. See Choper, The Religion Clauses of the FirstAmendment. Reconciling the Conflict,
41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 680 (1980).
92. See T. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 224 (1898).

The author concludes that the establishment clause was meant only to prevent the setting up
of a state church or the favoring of one religion over another. The author goes on to say that
the Constitution was not meant to prevent the government from recognizing religion or to
prevent the government from providing for it where "a proper recognition of Divine Providence in the working of the government might seem to require it," and where it might be
done without favoritism. See id. at 224; see also J. STOREY, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 593-95 (185 1); Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First

Amendment. Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 686-88 (1980) (religious purpose alone not enough for invalidation, must also have threat of impairment of religious
liberty).
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and presently accepted as constitutional by the judicial, executive,
and legislative branches of government, as well as society in general.93 The sanitizing effect of these two requirements would isolate
all public institutions and activities from any religious influence,
and promote a government hostility to religion, an attitude which is
neither mandated nor permitted by the Constitution.94
Nothing in the text or history of the first amendment justifies a
conclusion that all government action must have a secular purpose
and primary effect. Indeed, the religion clauses themselves had a
religious purpose and primary effect: to protect freedom of religion
and promote its free exercise.95 Not only do the clauses themselves
fail the secular purpose and primary effect prongs, but a consistent
application of those prongs would invalidate many laws and state
activities routinely accepted by our institutions as valid, e.g., statutes
designed to protect religious worship services, such as those prohibiting raucus acts within certain distances of churches, and prohibiting the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages nearby.96
Clearly, statutes of this type have both a religious purpose and a
primary effect which benefit religion. The same is true of the Sunday closing laws and tax exemptions for church properties, although, in cases involving those enactments, the Supreme Court
majority used ingenious rationalizations to deny the obvious. 97 The
released time program, approved by the Court in Zorach v. Clau93. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 444 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Choper, The
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673,

685 (1980) (taken literally, the Court's test would forbid commonly accepted things such as
exemption for conscientious objectors and Amish children's exemptions from mandatory
school attendance laws).

94. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 45 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (establishment clause does not require that public be insulated from religion); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 414 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring) (free exercise clause will conflict with Court's
construction of establishment clause).
95. See Howard, Up Against the Wal. The Uneasy Separationof Church and State, in

STATE AND POLITICS 5, 24 (J. Hensel ed. 1981). The author states that religious
liberty may be obtained by ensuring that individuals will have the right to freely exercise
their religious beliefs, and by prohibiting the establishment of a religion. The religion
clauses are made up of the free exercise clause and the establishment clause, hence the aim is
to secure religious liberty. See id at 24; see also Choper, The Religious Clauses of the First
CHURCH,

Amendment: Reconcilingthe Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 678 (1980) (central purpose of

religion clauses is to safeguard religious liberty).
96. See TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 109.33 (Vernon Supp. 1984) (counties may enact ordinance prohibiting sale of alcohol within 300 feet of church).
97. See W. KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 14 (1963).
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son,98 had a religious purpose and a primary effect of advancing religion.9 9 The overwhelming weight of historical evidence teaches that
the framers did not intend to impose secularism upon the government or require that it avoid all activity which would benefit religion. I" The first amendment was not a product of secularism but of
the very opposite-a deep seated desire to preserve religious liberty
and promote its free exercise.' 0'
The entanglement prong of the current test has been aptly described as nonsensical, and its product condemned as a value not
judicially secured by the Constitution. 10 2 Our society is permeated
with activities which result in an entanglement between government
and other institutions. Some of the activities are sponsored by the
government; others are only regulated by it. It has never been considered that those activities were constitutionally infirm simply because they produced an entanglement. Instead, the degree of
entanglement or difficulty in administering them has properly been
seen as a matter of policy. If the state stays within its sphere of
constitutional authority, its actions should be upheld; if it exceeds
those bounds, its actions should fall. They should not be held unconstitutional on the basis of a policy judgment that they cause an
excessive entanglement with religion. 10 3 Moreover, the entanglement test leads the Court to more and more subjective adjudications
and away from reasoned analysis on the basis of neutral principles,
98. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
99. See id at 311 (program allowed students to miss regular school in order to attend
religious classes).
100. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 395 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (nothing in first amendment requires Court to side with those who believe society should be entirely secular).
101. See W. MARNWELL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 111-13 (1964).
102. See Choper, The Religion Clauses of the FirstAmendment.- Reconcilingthe Conflict,

41 U. PmTr. L. REV. 673, 681 (1980) (avoiding entanglement is not a value "to be judicially
secured by the Establishment Clause"); Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The
Religion Clauses of the FirstAmendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REV. 3, 19

(1978-79) (entanglement test nonsensical).
103. See P. KAUPER, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 51 (1962). Kauper argues that the issue of constitutional power should not be confused with the question of
whether it is desirable or wise as a matter of policy for the government to exercise that
power. With respect to governmental assistance to parochial schools, for example, he argues
that the issue should be viewed from both the perspective of its impact on public schools and
from the perspective of what, if any, submission to governmental control will result from the
assistance, and that discussion of the issues should not be "obscured by indiscriminate invocation of the separation principle derived from the First Amendment." See id at 51.
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and it is incapable of application in any consistent way.' °4
Defenders of the entanglement prong argue that it is an appropriate test in church-state cases because one of the framers' motives in
proposing the amendment was the fear of an excessive entanglement
between the state and religion.' 0 5 There is no historical basis for
that view. The framers were mainly interested in protecting state
authority in religious matters from usurpation by the federal
government. 1o6
That the test is functionally defective can hardly be gainsaid. The
unpredictability of decisions, the inconsistency, and the constant
"moving of the wall of separation" to allow for state action deemed
innocuous all confirm the fact.° 7 The test provides virtually no guidance for determining the proper interplay between church and
state,'0 8 and its absolutist approach is a barrier, rather than an aid,
to enlightened constitutional analysis. 0 9 In addition, the threeprong test exacerbates the conflicts between the establishment clause
and the free exercise clause. The secular purpose and primary effect
requirements effectively prohibit any aid or benefit to religion;' 10
104. See Ripple, The Entanglement Test ofthe Religion Clauses -A Ten Year Assessment, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1195, 1238 (1980).
105. Cf Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (if state is involved in too great
a degree, it amounts to an establishment).
106. See R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION 8 (1982); Comment, Government Aid to Church-RelatedEducation.- An Alternative Rational, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REv. 617, 652 (framers changed wording of amendment to
protect already established state churches).
107. Cf. Choper, The Religion Clauses ofthe FirstAmendment." Reconciling the Conflict,
41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 685-86 (1980) (Court's decisions have been inconsistent depending
on circumstances); Comment, Toward the Logical and Consistent Adjudication of Establishment Clause Cases, 5 W. ST. U.L. REV. 117, 147 (1977) (Court's decisions have been untidy;
tests have arisen so that "absolute" wall may be moved when necessary).
108. See Choper, The Religion Clauses ofthe FirstAmendment." Reconciling the Conflict,
41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 674 (1980).
109. See Stanmeyer, Free Exercise and the Wall" The Obsolescence ofa Metaphor, 37
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 223, 240 (1968) (Court's method of interpretation is "rigid, all-embracing, rock like 'No Establishment' interpretation"); Comment, Toward the Logical and
Consistent Adjudication of Establishment Clause Cases, 5 W. ST. U.L. REV. 117, 127 (1977)
(Court's method of analysis has caused inconsistency and inability to properly consider
countervailing interests).
110. SeeEverson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947); see also Schwarz, No Imposition oReligion." The Establishment Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692, 692 (1968) (establishment clause interpreted to forbid aid). But see School Dist. of Abington Township v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (aid, the purpose of which is exclusively secular, may
incidentally benefit religion).
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yet, the free exercise clause, in many cases, requires accommodations which do benefit religion,"' e.g., released time programs in
school for religious exercises, 1 2 use of college facilities by religious
groups on an equal basis with other groups," 3 prohibition of discrimination in public welfare and unemployment compensation14
programs because of the religious beliefs of potential recipients,"
chaplains in the military and public institutions," 5 and the like.
Thus, constitutional scholars as well as the Court's justices have
called for a new, better reasoned, and consistent approach than that
provided by the narrow and mechanical three-prong test." 6 Some
justices have proposed discarding some or all of the prongs, and
seemingly all of them are disenchanted with the test." 7 Justice
Rehnquist has called for the Court to abandon its present position
on the establishment clause," 8 and he blames the Court's overly expansive interpretation of both the establishment and free exercise
clauses for the constant narrowing of the "channel between the
Scylla and Charybdis through which any state or federal action
must pass in order to survive constitutional scrutiny. '' 19
VIII.

THE NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH

The three-prong test should be discarded for a new theory of interpretation. As stated by Justice Stewart:
111. See Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion.- The Establishment Clause Value, 77
YALE L.J. 692, 692 (1968) (free exercise clause requires aid); cf.Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 404 (1963) (government should not place "burden upon the free exercise of religion").
112. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 311 (1952).
113. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-69 (1981).
114. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963).
115. See Illinois ex ret McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 254 (1948).
116. See Stanmeyer, Free Exercise and the Walk: The Obsolescence of a Metaphor,37
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 223, 243 (1968). The author states that:
the courts must return, as engineers and architects of the "Wall," to reread the no establishment clause in living harmony with the free exercise clause--to discover that in an
age of tolerance and cooperation the first amendment must be endowed with a meaning
at once more profound and more restricted than its frequent use as a ritualistic procrustean bed against which to measure all problems.
Id at 243.
117. See Howard, Up Against the Wall.- The Uneasy Separation of Church and State, in
CHURCH, STATE AND POLITICS 5, 22 (J. Hensel ed. 1981).
118. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 727 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(agrees with abandonment of establishment clause rhetoric but recognizes need for more
flexibility).
119. See idat 721.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

19

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 16 [2022], No. 1, Art. 1

ST MARJY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 16:1

I think it is the Court's duty to face up to the dilemma. . . . For so
long as the resounding but fallacious fundamentalist rhetoric of some
of our Establishment Clause opinions remains on our books, to be
disregarded at will as in the present case, or to be undiscriminatingly
invoked as in the Schempp case, so long will the possibility of consistent and perceptive decisions in this most difficult and delicate area of
constitutional law be impeded and impaired. And so long, I fear, will
the guarantee of true religious
freedom in our pluralistic society be
120
insecure.
and
uncertain
The Court should adopt a broad theory in establishment clause
cases which will be constitutionally correct, consistent, and workable and which will avoid the bizarre results the present test has produced. 12 1 It is submitted that none of the three main theories which
have gained acceptance in our society, and which have been described here, is proper or adequate to do this. They are all contrary
to the text and the history of the Constitution as well as the intent of
22
the framers who proposed the first amendment.

IX.

THREE MAIN THEORIES INADEQUATE BECAUSE NOT
SUPPORTED

A.

BY:

Text of the Constitution

Nothing can be found in the literal text of the establishment
clause which mandates absolute separation of church and state or
which mandates that government may not recognize religion as a
basis for any action, as called for by the Wall of Separation and the
Religion Blind theories. 123 In accordance with long accepted canons
of constitutional interpretation, "establishment" should be given the
120. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 416-17 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring).
121. Compare Marsh v. Chambers, - U.S. - -, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3336, 77 L. Ed. 2d
1019, 1029 (1983) (compensation of chaplain with state money does not violate establish-

ment clause) with Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 607 (1971) (supplementing parochial
school teachers' salaries violates establishment clause).
122. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 414 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring). "I think
that the Court's approach to the Establishment Clause has on occasion . . . been not only
insensitive, but positively wooden, and that the Court has accorded to the Establishment
Clause a meaning which neither the words, the history, nor the intention of the authors...
even remotely suggests." Id at 414.
123. Cf. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 820
(1973) (White, J., dissenting). "No one contends that he can discern from the sparse language of the Establishment Clause that a State is forbidden to aid Religion ....
Id at
820.
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ordinary
and usual meaning ascribed to it by those who employed
it.' 24 As will be shown later in this paper, neither the framers nor
the colonists, in general, thought of a religious establishment in any
but the strictest sense, i.e., an official church directly supported by
tax money. 125 Certainly, they did not equate cooperation with establishment. Neither, it is submitted, can the text be said to support
direct financial aid to churches as the accommodationists urge. If
direct financial aid is not an establishment of religion, it would seem
nothing would be.' 26 As indicated, direct support by compulsory
tax levies was one of the principal evils the framers wanted to avoid.
Some have argued that because the establishment clause uses the
phrase "respecting an establishment of religion"'' 27 instead of simply
saying Congress may not establish a religion, the text can support a
broad interpretation prohibiting any cooperation with or aid to religion. 28 But that argument is contradicted by the history of the first
amendment. 2 9 When Madison's proposed amendment first came
out of congressional committee, it read: "No religion shall be established by law, nor shall the equal rights of conscience be infringed."'' 30 Because that language could possibly be construed to
outlaw the existing state religious establishments, proposals were
advanced to change it, and ultimately the phrase "respecting an
establishment of religion" was adopted.' 3' Hence, the phrase "respecting an establishment" was meant to serve as a two-edged sword
124. See 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 16 (1956).
125. See D. HUTCHISON, THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION 287 (1975); Comment, Government Aid to Church-Related Education. An Alternative Rationale, 1978 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 617, 663-65.
126. See Comment, Government Aid to Church-RelatedEducation. An Alternative Rationale, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 617, 664-65.
127. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.

128. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (language is opaque, framers did not simply forbid establishment); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 220 (1963) (religion clauses overlap, present broad area for interpretation);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961) (amendment interpreted broadly); see also
C. LOWELL, THE GREAT CHURCH-STATE FRAUD 8 (1973).

129. Cf. Comment, Government Aid to Church-RelatedEducation. An Alternative Rationale, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 617, 652-53 (discussion of drafting of amendment and why it
was drafted as it was).
130. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 729, 731 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789).
131. See Comment, Government Aid to Church-RelatedEducation.: An Alternative Rationale, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 617, 652; see also Toscano, A DubiousNeutrality.- The Establishment of Secularism in the Public Schools, 1979 B.Y.U. L. REV. 177, 192 (churches established
by state were placed beyond power of federal government); Comment, The HistoricalMean-
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which would prevent the federal government from either establishing a national religion or disestablishing the existing state religions. 132 It was not intended as broad language to prohibit
government cooperation with religion.
B.

History of the Religion Clauses

The history of the religion clauses does not support Absolute Separation, Strict Neutrality, or Accommodation in all their elements.
Neither does it support the three-tiered test used by the Supreme
Court. 133 Constitutional scholars, as well as the Court's own justices, have complained that the Court's expansive interpretation of
the establishment clause is supported neither by history nor by the
intent of the framers. 134 Although the scholarly writing about the
history of the religion clauses is filled with contradictions 135 and is
often slanted or misstated by advocates seeking to support a particular viewpoint, 36 historical background is an accepted tool of constiing and Judicial Construction of the Establishment oReligion Clause of the First Amendment,
2 WASHBURN L.J. 65, 94-109 (1962) (outlines churches established in several states).
132. See 4 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 194 (1836); W. KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 9 (1963); THE SUPREME COURT ON CHURCH AND STATE Xiv (J. Tuss-

man ed. 1962); see also Comment, Government Aid to Church-Related Education: An
Alternative Rationale, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 617, 652-53 (clause drafted to prevent federal
government from establishing religion or interfering with state churches).
133. Cf. Borden, Federalists, Anifederalists, and Religious Freedom, 21 J. CHURCH &
ST. 469, 469 (1979) (framers committed to religious liberty); Choper, The Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITr. L. REV. 673, 677 (1980) (paramount purpose was to protect religious liberty); Hudspeth, Separation of Church and State in
America, 33 TEXAS L. REV. 1035, 1046 (1955) (clauses not meant to keep Congress from
protecting religion); Whitehead & Conlan, The Establishment of the Religion of Secular Humanism and Its First Amendment Implications, 10 TEx. TECH L. REV. 1, 25-26 (1978) (greatest influence on founders of American legal system was Blackstone, whose theory was that
God was source of all laws).
134. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 414 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring); R.
CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION

113 (1982) (historical records of early America make Court's interpretation untenable);
Howard, Up Against the Wall.- The Uneasy Separation of Church and State, in CHURCH,
STATE AND POLITICS 5, 33 (J. Hensel ed. 1981) (justices' reliance on their analysis of history
is "'illusion born of oversimplification' ").
135. See Borden, Federalists, Antifederalists, and Religious Freedom, 21 J. CHURCH &
ST. 469, 469 (1979).
136. See, e.g., W. KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 8 (1964) (all advocate clear support for their position in the Constitution, yet they are merely attempting to
fortify their position); R. MILLER & R. FLOWERS, TOWARD BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY:
CHURCH, STATE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 297 (1982) (no one can be sure of framers',
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tutional as well as statutory construction 37 and can furnish
legitimate guideposts for achieving a sound interpretation of the
clauses.' 38 Indeed, the Supreme Court has on several occasions approved government action on the basis of historical considerations
when such action would otherwise appear to be unconstitutional according to its present expansive interpretation of the establishment
clause. For example, in Walz v. Tax Commissioner,1 39 Mc Go wan v.
Maryland,40 and the recent case of Marsh v. Chambers,'4' the Court
upheld tax exemptions for religious property, laws requiring the
closing of businesses on Sunday, and the payment of legislative
chaplains with public funds respectively, all largely on the basis that
our people historically have viewed such action as non-violative of
the first amendment.
At the beginning of the American Revolution some kind of establishment existed in all thirteen colonies.142 Three of the original
states had official, established churches when the first amendment
was adopted, 143 and they continued for many years thereafter. In
fact, Massachusetts did not disestablish her official church until
1833, forty-six years after the Constitutional Convention.1'I Several
of the states practiced official discrimination and persecution against
some religious faiths and adherents until well into the nineteenth
exact intentions); C. PRITCHETT, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 32 (1968) (states that
"much of rhetoric of public debate has been in terms of invoking support of document for
proposals favored, and throwing doubt on constitutional legitimacy of actions opposed").
137. See Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 644, 681 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(Court's interpretation is properly influenced by history and precedent).
138. See id at 681 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("a page of history is worth a volume of
logic") (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1929)). See generally
Choper, The Religion Clauses of the FirstAmendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT.

L. REV. 673, 676 (1980) (appropriate to turn to historical intent when interpreting Constitution); Howard, Up Against the Wall The Uneasy Separation of Church and State, in
CHURCH, STATE AND POLITICS 5, 33 (J.
Hensel ed. 1981) (although sometimes criticized,
justices often base decisions on historical interpretation).
139. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
140. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
141. - U.S. - 103 S.Ct. 3330, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1019 (1983).
142. See H. BROWN, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLIC 25-26 (1977); L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM

92 (1967).

143. See H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT 210 (1972); THE SUPREME COURT
ON CHURCH AND STATE xiv

(J. Tussman ed. 1962).

144. See R. MILLER & R. FLOWERS, TOWARD BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY: CHURCH,
STATE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 4 (1982).
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century.145 The congress that proposed the first amendment also began the congressional chaplain system. 4 6 The Continental Congress opened with a prayer, set aside a national day of fasting and
prayer, provided for chaplains in the army, and employed a minister
to instruct the Congress in Christianity. 47 Contrary to modem belief, Benjamin Franklin's motion to open the Constitutional Convention sessions with prayer and to engage a chaplain was
adopted.' 48 As a general rule, the colonists believed there was a
God, and that the inalienable rights of man which they sought to
secure were rooted in Him.' 49 Their political documents were replete with references to a Supreme Being and with prayers for the
blessings of his Divine Providence.1 50
American law was no less theistic in its philosophy. Blackstone,
by far the greatest influence on the foundations of American law,
taught that "God was the source of all laws, whether they were
found in 'the Holy Scriptures' or were observable as they operated
in nature."' 5' All of the movements designed to achieve religious
liberty in the new nation, culminating in Madison's Memorial and
Remonstrance, 52 sought not to achieve separation but only equality
among the sects, nonpreferential treatment by the federal government, and freedom from coercion.15 3 To assert that the historical
145. See id at 2-4; L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 71-72 (1967); cf.Borden, Federalists,Antfederalists, andReligious Freedom, 21 J. CHURCH & ST. 469, 470 (1979).
146. See Murchison, How We've Changed, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 13, 1983, at
18, col. 3.
147. See L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 120 (1967).
148. See id at 122 (1967); 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1877, at
450-52 (Farrand ed. 1911); Hudspeth, Separationof Church and State in America, 33 TEXAS
L. REV. 1035, 1041-42 (1955).
149. See H. BROWN, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLIC 25 (1977).
150. See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 213 (1963)
(evidence of framers' beliefs easily seen in their writings); Whitehead & Conlan, The Establishment ofthe Religion of Secular Humanism andIts FirstAmendment Implications, 10 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 1, 25 (1978) (colonists readily recognized belief in supreme being).
151. See W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES "40-41; Whitehead & Conlan, The Establishment of the Religion ofSecular Humanism andIts FirstAmendment Implications, 10 TEX.
TECH L. REv. 1, 25-26 (1978).
152. According to one commentator, Madison's writing is "one of the great documents
in the history of human liberty." See L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 111-13
(1967) (also gives summary of "memorial").
153. See D. HUTCHISON, THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION 187-88 (1975);
Borden, Federalists,Antifederalists, and Religious Freedom, 21 J. CHURCH & ST. 469, 477
(1979); Comment, Jefferson andthe Church-State Wall 4 HistoricalExaminationofthe Man
and the Metaphor, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 645, 661-63.
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purpose of the religion clauses was to effect a total separation of
church and state or to 1render
government religion blind, is to ignore
54
the historical realities.
C. Intention of the Framers
Despite much rhetoric to the contrary, the historical evidence also
reveals that the framers' intent was to provide equality, nonpreferential treatment, and freedom from coercion as regards religion and
religious organizations-not absolute separation or religion blind
government.' 55 It is, of course, impossible to determine the exact
subjective intent of the framers, but their backgrounds, actions, and
writings do reveal156some facts from which much can be learned
about their intent.
James Madison and Thomas Jefferson are often cited to prove
that absolute separation was the intent, but their writings, statements, and actions demonstrate otherwise. 157 Madison's Memorial
and Remonstrance,for example, considered the precursor of the religion clauses, emphasized equality of religions. It said: "The bill
[Patrick Henry's bill establishing a provision for teachers of the
Christian religion] violates that equality which ought to be the basis
of every law . . . , the bill violates equality by subjecting some to
peculiar burdens, [and] .. .by granting to others peculiar exemptions." 58 In 1785, Madison joined Jefferson in introducing a bill in
154. See H. BROWN, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLIC 103-06 (1977); Toscano,

A Dubious Neutrality: The Establishment of Secularism in the Public Schools, 1979 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 177, 190 (religion clauses do not require wall of separation); Comment, Jefferson and
the Church-State Wall: A Historical Examination of the Man and the Metaphor, 1978 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 645, 665 (to conclude that it was meant to create total separation ignores historical
reality).
155. See Whitehead & Conlan, The Establishment of the Religion of Secular Humanism
and Its First Amendment Implications, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 1-4 (1978); Comment, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1057 (1978).
156. See L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958); Kurland, Of Church and State and
the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. i, 2-6 (1961).
157. See P. FONER, BASIC WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 360 (1950); J. WHITEHEAD, THE SEPARATION ILLUSION 45-94 (1977); Comment, Jefferson and the Church-State
Wall: A Historical Examination of the Man and the Metaphor, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 645, 672
(Jefferson looked for peace and harmony between church and state).
158. See I LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 162 (1865); see also
Comment, Jefferson and the Church-State Wall A Historical Examination of the Man and
the Metaphor, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 645, 663 (the Memorial is proof that Madison believed
one religion should not be favored above another).
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the Virginia House of Burgesses appointing an official day of fasting
and thanksgiving, and which also provided that preachers who
failed to conduct religious services on the prescribed day would be
fined.' 9 Madison, as a member of the Board of Visitors of the University of Virginia, a state institution, approved the report and the
suggestions of its rector, Thomas Jefferson, that the students "will be
. . . expected to attend religious worship at the establishment of
their respective sects, in the morning, and in time to meet their
school in the university at its stated hour."' 6 ° Madison himself
stated that the religion clauses were prompted because "the people
feared one sect might obtain a preeminence, or two combine together, and establish a religion to which they would compel others
to conform."' 16 1 Madison designated several days of fasting and
thanksgiving while he was President.'62
Jefferson, whose name and famous metaphor are most often invoked to support absolute separation, really advocated an impartial
accommodation standard. While some of Jefferson's statements appear to support absolute separation, a careful examination of them
in context demonstrates that the position he articulated in them was
one of federalism rather than separation, and was directed only toward the federal government. 163 This is illustrated by his letter to
the Reverend Samuel Miller:
Certainly, no power to prescribe any religious exercise, or to assume
authority in religious discipline, has been delegated to the General
[federal] Government. It must then rest with the States, as far as it
can be in any human authority . . . . I do not believe it is for the
interest of religion to invite the civil magistrate to direct its exercises,
159. See 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 556 (J. Boyd ed. 1950); Comment, Jefferson and the Church-State Wall A Historical Examination of the Man and the Metaphor,
1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 645, 657 (general and brief discussion of bill).
160. See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 246 (1948) (Reed,
J., dissenting)(quoting 19 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 449 (Memorial ed. 1904)).

161. See Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMP.
3, 11 (1949); Whitehead & Conlan, The Establishment ofthe Religion ofSecular Humanism and Its First Amendment Implications, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. I, 3 (1978) (Madison's
fear was that one sect might dominate another).
162. See A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 88-89
(1964).
163. See THE KENTUCKY-VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS AND MR. MADISON'S REPORT OF
1799, at 15-82 (1960); Comment, Jefferson and the Church-State Wall: A Historical Examination of the Man and the Metaphor, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 645, 645 (Jefferson establishment
clause was study in federalism).
PROBS.
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its discipline, or its doctrines; nor of the religious societies, that the
General Government should be invested with the power of effecting
any uniformity of time or matter among them."
His position with reference to state action was one of equal, nonpreferential, and noncoercive treatment, with any state assistance to
religion being equally available to all. 65 In almost all of his writings and public utterances, Jefferson spoke not of separation of
church and state, but of "religious freedom."'' 66 He thought of an
establishment of religion in terms of preferential, unequal
treatment:
I have a view of the subject which ought to displease neither the rational Christian nor Deists, and would reconcile many to a character
they have too hastily rejected. . . . The delusion into which the
X.Y.Z. plot showed it possible to push to the people; the successful
experiment made under the prevalence of that delusion on the clause
of the Constitution, which, while it secured the freedom of the press,
covered also the freedom of religion, had given to the clergy a very
favorite hope of obtaining an establishment of a particular form of
Christianity through the United States; and as every sect believes its
own form the true one, every one perhaps hoped for his own, but
especially the Episcopalians and Congregationalists. The returning
good sense of our country threatens abortion to their hopes, and they
believe that any portion of power confided to me, will be exerted in
opposition to their schemes. And they believe rightly; for I have
sworn upon the alter of God, eternal hostility against every form of
tyranny over the mind of man. But this is all they have to fear from
me: and enough too in their opinion.' 6 7
Jefferson was a Theist and he believed there was a common core
of religious and moral belief to which all men could subscribe, and
68
which was essential to good citizenship and good government.

164. JEFFERSON'S LETTERs 241 (Arr. W. Whitman) (letter to Rev. Samuel Miller, Jan.
23, 1808).
165. See Comment, Jefferson and the Church-State Walk A HistoricalExamination of
the Man and the Metaphor, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 645, 661-62, 666-71.

166. See JEFFERSON'S LETTERS 153 (Arr. W. Whitman) (letter to the President, Sept. 9,
1792); see also id.at 84 (letter to James Madison, Dec. 20, 1787).

167. See id at 198 (letter to Dr. Benjamin Rush, Sept. 23, 1800).
168. See Derr, The First Amendment as a Guide to Church-State Relations. Theological
Illusions, CulturalFantasies,and Legal Practicalities,in CHURCH, STATE AND POLITICS 75,

78-80 (J. Hensel ed. 198 1) (religion was essential to smooth running of country; people with
religious natures tend to be good citizens).
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Far from advocating an absence of religious influence from public
affairs, he believed it was an essential requirement of good government. It was the ecclesiastical dogma and hierarchy he disapproved
of and distrusted; he wanted to avoid the oppression and coercion
169
which might result if one sect became dominate over others.
One of Jefferson's first public acts in Virginia on the subject of
religion came in 1776 when he authored the Resolutionfor Disestablishing the Church of Englandandfor RepealingLaws Interfering with
Freedom of Worship.17 o The resolution proposed that no "preeminence may be allowed to any one religious sect over another" and
that coercive levies to support the Church of England be abolished.'' Jefferson himself wrote that his resolution was written for
the purpose of taking away the privilege and preeminence of one
religious sect over another and to establish equal rights among
all. 172 His Virginia Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom'7 3 is
sometimes offered as proof that he advocated a philosophy of strict
separation, but neither the language of that bill nor Jefferson's other
writings and actions support that view."'7 The bill shows that its
purpose was to eliminate taxes to support one preferred religion and
prohibit general levies to support ministers and build sectarian edifices - in other words, to avoid preferential treatment and coercion
in the form of direct taxes to support religion. 175 Nothing in the text
or the history of that bill lends support to the conclusion that Jefferson envisioned or intended a complete separation
between church
76
phrase.
the
of
sense
modem
the
and state in

169. See H. BROWN, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLIC 25, 26 (1977); Derr, The
First Amendment as a Guide to Church-State Relations: Theological Illusions, Cultural Fantasies, and Legal Practicalities, in CHURCH, STATE AND POLITICS 75, 78-80 (J. Hensel ed.

1981).
170. See I THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 530 (J. Boyd ed. 1950).

171. See id at 530.
172. See id at 531.
173. See 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 545 (J. Boyd ed. 1950).

174. See Comment, Jefferson and the Church-State Wall: .4 Historical Examination of
the Man and the Metaphor, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 645, 664-66.

175. See id at 664 (bill designed to prevent both taxation to support one preferred
religion and taxation "to pay ministerial salaries and build sectarian edifices for all
religions").
176. See J. KIK, THE SUPREME COURT AND PRAYER IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 24
(1963); cf.Whitehead & Conlan, The Establishment ofthe Religion of Secular Humanism and
Its First Amendment Implications, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1978).
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The religion bill itself began with language which would be offensive to strict separationists:
Almighty God hath created the mind free,
that all attempts to
influence it by temporal punishments.
or burthens, or by civil incapacitations, tend only to beget habits of hypocrisy and meanness,
and are a departure from the plan of the Holy author of our religion,
who being Lord both of body and mind, yet chose not to propagate it
by coercions on either, as was in his Almighty power to do . ..

."'

The Virginia Billfor Religious Freedom was the first of a group of
five bills authored and introduced by Jefferson dealing with religion."'8 The second was the Billfor Saving the Property of the
Church Heretofore by Law Established79 It was designed to protect
The third
the property of the disestablished Anglican Church.'
was his Billfor Punishing Disturbersof Religious Worship and Sabbath Breakers.'8' The fourth bill was the Billfor Appointing Days of
Public Fastingand Thanksgiving, which Madison joined in proposing.' 82 It set aside official days for fasting and worship and even
compelled ministers of the gospel to perform religious services on
prescribed days on pain of fines for violation. 183 The fifth bill was
the BillAnnulling MarriagesProhibitedby the Levitical Law, 84 and,
as its title implies, it declared all marriages prohibited by the Levitical Law of the Bible to be void. Incredibly, by the standards of the
modem Wall of Separation or Religion Blind theories, the lastfour
of these bills by Jefferson would be unconstitutional They also would
violate one or more of the Supreme Court's three prongs. They
were all designed to aid, and each one had the primary effect of
advancing religion; the fourth, which mandated the holding of religious services with fines for violations, would also create an excessive entanglement between government and religion, according to
the Court's present view. It seems clear that Jefferson, like Madison,
177. See 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 545 (J. Boyd ed. 1950); see also Comment, Jefferson and the Church-State Wall: A HistoricalExamination of the Man and the
Metaphor, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 645, 665 (language offensive to separationists).

178. See 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 545 (J. Boyd ed. 1950).
179. See id at 553.
180. See Comment, Jefferson and the Church-State Wall A HistoricalExamination of
the Man and the Metaphor, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 645, 665.
181. See 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 555 (J. Boyd ed. 1950).
182. See id at 556.
183. See id at 556.
184. See id at 556.
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wanted to prevent only inequality and coercion, and that he believed government interaction and cooperation with religious institutions was both permissible and necessary.18 5
Jefferson took great pains to ensure that religious training and
worship were accommodated at his beloved University of Virginia. 1 6 He took pride in the fact that all four religious denominations in his hometown of Charlottesville used the tax supported
county courthouse on alternate Sundays as their "common temple"
of worship."8 7 One may legitimately join with Joel Hanson in asking the question: "Where is the wall of separation between church
and state when the courthouse is used as the common temple of all
'
the religious sects of a village?" 118
Jefferson's use of the wall of separation metaphor in his letter to
the Danbury Baptist Association 8 9 does not support a conclusion
that he advocated the separationist view. Those who rely on the
metaphor fail to recognize the context of federalism in which it was
used and the subsequent attempts Jefferson made to explain it.' 90
The wall Jefferson tried to erect was between the federal government and the states, which under both the first and the tenth amendments retained all authority in church-state matters.' 9' His refusal
to declare a national day of thanksgiving while President was based
on a desire not to usurp the authority of the states, not as a gesture
to religion blind government. 9 2 Indeed, he urged such a day at the
185. See Comment, Jefferson and the Church-State Wall: A Historical Examination of
the Man and the Metaphor, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 645, 654-55 (quoting THE KENTUCKYVIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS AND MR. MADISON'S REPORT OF 1799, at 2-3 (1960)).
186. See id.at 669; see also A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE
UNITED STATES 54 (1964) (Jefferson's respect for religion shown by scheme for University of
Virginia).
187. See WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 346 (P. Ford ed. 1905) (letter from Jefferson

to Dr. Thomas Cooper).
188. See Comment, Jefferson and the Church-State Wall A Historical Examination of
the Man and the Metaphor, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 645, 668.
189. See 16 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 281-82 (Monticello ed. 1904).
190. See 11 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 428-29 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1904)

(letter to Rev. Samuel Miller, Jan. 23, 1808); Comment, Jefferson and the Church-State
Wall A Historical Examination ofthe Man and the Metaphor, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 645, 658

(discusses Jefferson's attempts to explain the wall created in the "Danbury letter" both in his
second inaugural speech and letter to Rev. Miller).
191. See Comment, Jefferson and the Church-State Wall. A Historical Examination of
the Man and the Metaphor, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 645, 654-55, 659.

192. See id at 658-59.
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state level in Virginia. 193 It seems obvious that Jefferson's idea was
not separation but religious liberty and tolerance.
Lest it be argued that Jefferson's ideas of nonpreferential and
noncoercive cooperation changed after the adoption of the first
amendment, it is well to consider his postadoption actions and writings. His second inaugural address, as well as his later writings,
confirms that his goal was to avoid any usurpation by 1the
federal
94
matters.
religious
in
government of the state's authority
Other leaders who influenced the adoption of the Bill of Rights
held the same general view, and their statements and writings which
sound separationist are really expressions of federalism. Alexander
Hamilton, for example, opposed the religion clauses because he saw
them only as restrictions on the power of the federal government,
and he felt they were unnecessary for that purpose because the Constitution was already clear on that point. 195 Samuel Livermore, of
New Hampshire, one of those most influential in framing the religion clauses, desired the broader language "Congress shall make no
law touching religion," rather than the first draft's "[n]o national
religion shall be established by law," because he wanted to make it
clear that Congress not only was prohibited from establishing a national church, but would also be powerless to interfere with the state
established churches then existing, including his own state of New
Hampshire. 196 Benjamin Franklin's ideal was to ensure religious
freedom, and his motion to begin the convention sessions with a
prayer for divine guidance confirms that he did not favor strict separation as that term is understood today.' 97 The Continental Con193. See 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 556 (J. Boyd ed. 1950); see also Comment, Jefferson and the Church-State Wall A HistoricalExamination of the Man and the
Metaphor, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 645, 645 (as a legislator in Virginia, Jefferson proposed a bill
which would have allowed the Governor to set days of fasting and thanksgiving).
194. See Comment, Jefferson and the Church-State Wall- A HistoricalExamination of
the Man and the Metaphor, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 645, 666, 668.
195. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 263 (A. Hamilton) (R. Fairfield ed. 1981) (Bill of
Rights unnecessary and could be dangerous); see also R. MILLER & R. FLOWERS, TOWARD
BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY: CHURCH, STATEj AND THE SUPREME COURT 5 (1982) (including Bill of Rights not necessary and posed problem of inadvertantly omitting some rights).
196. See W. KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 9 (1964) (original language sought indicates desire to protect states from federal interference); A. STOKES & L.
PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 47 (1964) (language used by
Livermore indicates his state favored religious freedom and did not want to be governed by
federal government).
197. Cf A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 40-41
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gress instituted several fast days, and John Adams in approving that
action wrote his wife, Abigail: "We have appointed a Continental
fast. Millions will be upon their knees at once before their great
Creator, imploring His forgiveness
and blessing; His smiles on
198
American Councils and arms."'
By joint resolution of Congress, a religious service was made an
official part of the inauguration of George Washington. 199 James
Monroe, John Quincy Adams, and Thomas Jefferson all spent federal money to Christianize the Indians. 200 Are those the actions of
men who believed government could not take cognizance of religion
or do anything to aid it? The overwhelming weight of historical
evidence teaches that the colonists in general, and the framers in
particular, intended only to bar the federal government from establishing a national church and from interfering with state authority
in religious matters, and that the religious liberty they sought to secure was one of equality and noncoercion. 20 1 Their views cannot be
reconciled with the tenets of the Wall of Separation or the Strict
Neutrality theories. They come closer to the Accommodation theory, but differ from its pure form in that most of the framers would
not approve of direct financial aid to sectarian religion, primarily
because that involves coercing taxpayers to support a religion not of
their choosing.
X.

UNWORKABILITY OF THE THEORIES

The three main theories are also practically unworkable and produce unreasonable results. The absolute separation and religion
(1964) (Franklin supportive of both religion and freedom of religion); Hudspeth, Separation
of Church and State in America, 33 TEXAS L. REv. 1035, 1041-42 (1955) (Franklin made
motion to begin session with prayer).
198. See A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 83
(1964) (quoting letter of John Adams).
199. See JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSIONS OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA (Washington, Cales & Seaton eds. 1820).
200. See Murchison, How We've Changed,DALLAS MORNINO NEWS, Jan. 13, 1983, at
18, col. 3.
201. See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 309-10 (1963)
(Stewart, J., dissenting); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 244-49
(1940) (Reed, J., dissenting); H. BROWN, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLIC 25-26

(1977); Clark, Comments on Some Policies Underlying the ConstitutionalLaw ofReligious
Freedom,64 MINN.L. REV. 453, 458 (1980); Whitehead & Conlan, The Establishment0fthe
Religion of Secular Humanism and Its FirstAmendment Implications, 10 TEx. TECH L. REV.
1, 3 (1978).
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blind approaches are impossible to apply consistently. There are
too many instances when circumstances require an interaction between government and religion.2"2 When the Court attempts to allow that interaction by "moving the wall" or by redefining the term
"neutrality," it produces confusion, bizarre results, and a lack of
faith in the integrity of the judicial system.2 °3 The Supreme Court
has recognized that total separation between church and state is
neither required nor possible.2 °4 Yet it continues to pay homage to
the principle of separation, prompting one justice to observe that the
"wall of separation between church and state [has become] as winding as the famous serpentine wall designed by Mr. Jefferson for the
University he founded,

' 20 5

and another justice to observe that the

wall of separation has now become a vague and indistinct barrier.2°
Dallen Oaks well expressed the Separation theory's lack of legitimacy and efficacy when he said: "[tihere is something anomalous
about a wall which will admit a bus without the slightest breach, but
is impermeable to a prayer. "207
Likewise, strict neutrality or religion blind government is impossible of consistent application in a manner faithful to the Constitution. 2 8

A literal application of that concept would promote

government hostility to religion, a result which is universally con-

demned in word, 20 9 but often promoted in fact. 2 10 For when the

202. See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 309 (1963)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (religion and government must interact in numerous ways); Illinois
ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 239 (1940) (Reed, J., dissenting) (government and religion must constantly interact).
203. See H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT 252 (1972); Choper, The Religion
Clausesof the FirstAmendment. Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PiTT. L. REV. 673, 674 (1980)
(Court's tests have provided no clear guidance, nor have they explained problems involved).
204. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971); School Dist. of Abington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 309 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Illinois ex re. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 239 (1940) (Reed, J., dissenting).
205. See Illinois ex re. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 238 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring).
206. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
207. See D. OAKS, THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 2-3 (1963).
208. See, e.g., Howard, Up Against the Wall: The Uneasy Separation of Church and
State, in CHURCH, STATE AND POLITIcs 5, 25 (J. Hensel ed. 1981) (neutrality has been elusive guideline and difficult to apply); Kurland, Of Church andState and the Supreme Court,
29 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 5 (1961) (neutrality not "entirely satisfactory criterion"); Whitehead &
Conlan, The Establishment of the Religion of Secular Humanism and Its First Amendment
Implications, 10 TEx. TECH L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1978) (neutrality is at best a wishful illusion).
209. See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963)
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government requires that, in the name of neutrality, all state action
have a purely secular purpose as well as a primary effect which does
not advance religion, it takes sides with secularism and against theistic religion.2 1' The result is not only a government hostility to theistic religion, but ironically the establishment of the religion of
Secular Humanism. 212 The Supreme Court has accepted the fact
that all sincerely held beliefs concerning ultimate values qualify as
religion in terms of constitutional protection 213 and has expressly
held that Secular Humanism is such a religion.214 By requiring that
all government action have both a secular purpose and a secular
primary effect, government promotes secularism, which is a religion. 2 This is not so with other anti-religious movements or philosophies, such as Marxism. Government does not promote
Marxism by a secular commitment, but it does promote secularism
by such a commitment. In the words of Justice Potter Stewart, the
denial of a religious emphasis in public life is not merely the realization of neutrality, "but rather. . . the establishment of a religion of
secularism. ' 21 6 In its commendable attempts to avoid hostility to
theistic religion and accommodate the religious attitudes and traditions of our people, the Court has made the term "strict neutrality"
meaningless.2 17
Accommodation, if followed in its pure form, would fare no better. In our pluralistic society with our proliferation of religious
sects, direct financial aid to religion on an equal basis would be im(Court may not affirmatively oppose religion); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)
(no constitutional requirement that there be hostility towards religion).
210. See H. BROWN, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLIC 26 (1972); Toscano, A
Dubious Neutrality" The Establishment of Secularism in the Public Schools, 1979 B.Y.U. L.

REV. 177, 184, 187 (while Court claims neutrality, it is actually favoring secular humanism
over theism).
211. See Choper, The Religion Clauses ofthe FirstAmendment." Reconciling the Conflict,
41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 688 (1980).
212. See Toscano, A Dubious Neutrality. The Establishment of Secularism in the Public
Schools, 1979 B.Y.U. L. REV. 177, 187-88.
213. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970); see also Note, The Sacred
andthe Profane.: A FirstAmendment Definition ofReligion, 61 TEXAS L. REV. 139, 149 (1982)

(Supreme Court attempts definition of religious belief).
214. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.ll (1961).

215. Seeid at 495 n.ll.
216. See School Dist. of Abington Township v.Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 313 (1963)
(Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
217. See Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 422 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (neutrality is not strict).
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possible, and if attempted would likely result in the establishment of
a multitude of churches in violation of the literal text of the establishment clause.2 18
XI.

A NEW APPROACH -

BENIGN NEUTRALITY

It is submitted that accepted canons of constitutional interpretation and the great weight of historical evidence, not to mention common sense and reason, confirm that the attitude of government
toward religion mandated by the Constitution is that of Benign
Neutrality. The word "benign" is used to indicate a harmless and
favorable disposition. 219 Benign Neutrality, of course, is not a term
which was used by the framers or by the average American citizen
at the time of the adoption of the first amendment. They thought
and wrote simply in terms of religious freedom, and at that time the
government's relationship to religion had not yet been placed in a
context which required it to be characterized in such a way. The
concept, however, is essentially the same, because they sought to affirmatively promote religious freedom while avoiding compulsion
and preferential treatment. 220 To do that, the state must have an
attitude that is not hostile toward religion, but at the same time is
neutral and noncoercive, i.e., an attitude of friendly and harmless
neutrality. Chief Justice Burger's term "benevolent neutrality" was
not chosen to describe this approach because, while he states that
government may have a benevolent neutrality toward religion, he
would still require a secular purpose for any government action.22 '
The Benign Neutrality concept is that the religion clauses should
be read together as stating a single principle of religious liberty, and
in securing that liberty, government (1) is neither required nor permitted to be pro-secular or religion blind, (2) it may permit and indirectly support action which benefits religion if it is nonpreferential
between all religions and nonreligion and is not coercive, (3) it may
aid religion incidentally and indirectly if the action has a secular
218. Cf.U.S. CONST. amend I.
219. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 204 (1968).
220. See L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 127 (1967) (author states that
"independence of religion and government was the alpha and omega of democracy and
freedom").
221. See Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) (government may be benevolent towards religion but may not sponsor religion).
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purpose; or if it has a religious purpose, it is nonpreferential, but
(4) it may not financially aid or subsidize religion directly.
Faithful to Constitutional Text, History, and Concept of
Religious Liberty
Benign Neutrality is faithful to the text, history, and concept of
the religion clauses because they were designed to protect religious
freedom; that can only be accomplished if government has a kind or
generous neutrality toward religion. As has been demonstrated, the
first amendment sought to secure religious liberty, not by isolating
government from religion or by excising from our public life and
institutions all religious emphasis, but by ensuring equality among
religions and prohibiting coercion of all forms. 222 Furthermore, as
pointed out earlier, to prohibit all government recognition or accommodation in matters of religion actually places government on
the side of secularism and establishes the religion of Secular
Humanism.223
The Supreme Court takes great pains to insist that its three-prong
test promotes neutrality, but, in fact, the government is not neutral
when, at the instance of one already protected from compulsion, it
lends its power to the suppression of religion and thereby champions the cause of freedom from religion.224 So, government cannot
be truly neutral in religious matters unless it recognizes and reasonably accommodates the religious traditions and practices of our people short of establishing an official church and short of infringing on
the free exercise of religion. 225 This cooperation and accommodation may constitutionally extend to action which indirectly benefits
or advances religion if it has a secular purpose or has a religious
purpose and is nonpreferential.
There is nothing in the text or history of the Constitution to indiA.

222. Cf. H. BROwN, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLIC 247 (1977); Whitehead

& Conlan, The Establishment of the Reigion of Secular Humanism and Its First Amendment
Implications, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 2-4 (1978); Comment, Jefferson andthe Church-State
Wall-. A HistoricalExamination ofthe Man and the Metaphor, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 645, 673.
223. See Whitehead & Conlan, The Establishment of the Religion of Secular Humanism
and Its FirstAmendment Implications, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 23 (1978).
224. See Kirven, Freedom ofReligion or Freedomfrom Religion?, 48 A.B.A. J. 816, 818
(1962).
225. See P. KAUPER, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 10 (1962); Choper, The
Religion Clauses of the FirstAmendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673,
687, 694 (1980).
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cate that it intended government actions to have only secular purposes. The secular purpose doctrine is simply a creature of the
Supreme Court designed to aid in determining when state action
constitutes an establishment of religion,226 but it has been ineflective
in attempting to accomplish that purpose. The secular purpose requirement should be abandoned for a nonpreferential requirement.
Nonbelievers, however, should also be protected, as noted by
Madison: "Whilst we assert for ourselves a freedom to embrace, to
profess and to observe the Religion which we believe to be of divine
origin, we cannot deny an equal freedom to those whose minds have
not yet yielded to the evidence which has convinced us."' 227 Jefferson

also made it clear that his concept of religious freedom protected the
believers of all sects, as well as the infidel. 228 Benign Neutrality's
requirement of noncoercion and nonpreferential treatment between
religions and nonreligion would provide that protection.
The concept of Benign Neutrality would prohibit direct financial
aid or subsidies to religion because such funding would violate the
literal text of the establishment clause and would entail coercion in
the form of forced tax levies used to promote a creed not of the
taxpayers' choosing, a practice the framers especially abhorred.229
B.

Consistent and Workable

The Benign Neutrality theory would not only be constitutionally
correct, it would also be consistent and workable. By candidly allowing nonpreferential government cooperation with religion, it
would avoid conflicting decisions by removing the need for courts to
move the "wall" or redefine the terms whenever an interplay between government and religion is necessary or desirable. Consistency and predictability would inevitably result. It would do away
with any need to define religion or to determine what is a religious
or secular purpose and effect, problems which have greatly perplexed the courts. 230 The courts would be freed from the struggle to
226. See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1963);
Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT.

L. REV. 673, 686-87 (1980).
227. See THE COMPLETE MADISON 301 (S.Padover ed. 1953).
228. See L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 114 (1967).
229. See W. KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 26 (1963).
230. See Comment, Toward the Logical and Consistent Adjudication of Establishment
Clause Cases, 5 W. ST. U.L. REV. 117, 131 (1977).
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decide if there will be an excessive entanglement with religion.
With nonpreferential and noncoercive support of religion permitted
under the Constitution, any entanglement between government and
religior, would be simply a policy concern rather than a judicial one.
C. Harmonious With the Free Exercise Clause
More importantly, Benign Neutrality would greatly reduce, if not
remove entirely, those conflicts between the establishment clause
and the free exercise clause which have given the Supreme Court
and constitutional scholars so much difficulty.13 1 Benign Neutrality
would leave the free exercise clause largely unfettered and ready to
be applied whenever government action tends to restrict or coerce
religious beliefs or practices. The establishment clause would come
into play only when there is coercion, preferential treatment, or direct financial aid. Most of the tension between the clauses arises
when the present expansive interpretation of the establishment
clause requires the courts to invalidate indirect and incidental benefits to religion arising from state action, which in turn infringes on
the free exercise rights of the citizens involved.232 This dilemma has
caused the courts to attempt a balancing act between the establishand the free exercise clauses which has largely been unsuccessment
ful. 233 When indirect, nonpreferential aid to religion is freely
permitted, the likelihood of a legitimate establishment prohibition
conflicting with the free exercise clause will be slight.
Concededly, nonpreferential treatment would be difficult to ensure legislatively and administratively if programs or practices are
expansive, but that would simply be part of the policy decision to be
made. If administering the program in a nonpreferential way would
be too difficult, the policy decision might well be to abandon the
program. But the difficulty of administering government programs
234
is not a legitimate basis for a determination of constitutionality.
231. See Choper, The Religion Clauses of the FirstAmendment. Reconciling the Conflict,
41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 673 (1980); Clark, Comments on Some Policies Underlying the Constitutional Law ofReligious Freedom, 64 MINN. L. REV. 453, 455-56 (1980).

232. See Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970); Choper, The Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment. Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 674
(1980).
233. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972); Choper, The Religion Clauses of
the FirstAmendment. Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 674 (1980).

234. Cf. Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 700 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (pros-
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It is or should be a legislative or executive decision, not a judicial
one.
XII. CONCLUSION
stated in Illinois ex rel McCollum v. Board of
Justice Reed
2a5
Education."
The prohibition of enactments respecting the establishment of religion
does not bar every friendly gesture between church and state. It is not
an absolute prohibition against every conceivable situation where the
two may work together any more than the other prohibitions of the
First Amendment - free speech, free press - are absolutes ...
Devotion to the great principle of religious liberty should not lead us
guarantee that conflicts
into a rigid interpretation of the constitutional
236
with accepted habits of our people.
Additionally, as observed by Justice Harlan in Sherbert v. Verner,237
a rigid interpretation of the establishment clause may defeat the
very purpose of the religion clauses, which was drafted to ensure
that no religion be sponsored or favored, none commanded, and
none inhibited.238
Considering the difficulty now being experienced in adjudicating
church-state matters, as well as the incredible morass of conflicting
and unprincipled decisions, the relative simplicity of the Benign
Neutrality theory should appeal to all. Its faithfulness to the principles of constitutional interpretation and to the ideal of religious liberty envisioned by our forefathers, and included by them in the Bill
of Rights, should command the support of all.

pect of hard constitutional questions not basis for forbidding action which is constitutionally
permissible); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 320 (1963)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (conceivable that constitutional standard may not be met but not
reason enough to deny opportunity).
235. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).

236. Id at 255-56 (Reed, J., dissenting).
237. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
238. See id at 421 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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